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ABSTRACT: This paper will analyze the conflict between creditors’ inherent right for satisfaction of their outstanding 
monetary judgments and the difficulties that debtors confront in satisfying the outstanding award levied against them. 
To establish the theory that the civil justice system has “resuscitated” the antebellum debtors’ prison and infringed 
upon principles of civil liberties, this paper will examine evidence in a three-pronged analysis of economics, history, and 
a reflection on the American legal systems.
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INTRODUCTION
Filing a lawsuit, regardless of its aim, is to formally 
“declare war” against another party for the legal right to 
act, or not to act, in a specific circumstance. The courts 
exist to determine which party deserves more justice 
than the other. As a branch of our tripartite government, 
the courts decide what is best for society. But what if our 
court system fails to serve our society’s best interests? It is 
incumbent upon those who are subjugated by the injustice 
to denounce said injustice because it is one of the many 
rights conferred to us by the Constitution. In the scope 
of collections law, particularly post-judgment matters, 
there lurks an injustice which allows for individuals to 
be incarcerated for the nonpayment of debt. Given the 
wealth of authorities who have addressed the issue ad 
nauseum, one would believe that a proper solution has 
been attained—sadly, we have not yet found one. Here 
we will discuss, in a two-part analysis, where we derived 
the laws and principles that allowed debtor incarceration 
to happen and the inherent issues with legal systems.
I. HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF THE ANTEBELLUM 
DEBTORS' PRISON OF ENGLAND AND THE 
CONVEYANCE OF COMMON LAW TO THE 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CIVIL LEGAL SYSTEM 
To demonstrate how the “contemporary debtors’ prison” 
has ridden on the coattails of the bygone debtors’ prison, 
it is pertinent to understand historical precedent. As 
America’s debtor prisons have evolved from English 
Common Law and its punitive systems of remuneration, 
it is significant to mention the underpinnings of such a 
system. Imprisonment for debt is not a historical oddity. 
It is a lengthy tale beginning in the Medieval Period. 
The recognition of imprisonment for debt in formal 
English law in the Industrial Age was also the product 
of purpose-driven aims for mitigating civil grievances. 
See C. Fane, Esq., Observations on the Proposed Abolition 
of Imprisonment for Debt on Mesne Process; Shewing Its 
Probable Effects in Disabling Creditors from Forcing Their 
Debtors into Bankruptcy, Trust-deeds, or Compositions. 
London: S. Sweet, Law Bookseller and Publisher pg. 16 
(1838). As the English author and philanthropist Dr. 
Samuel Johnson has aptly put:
Surely, he whose debtor has perished in prison, 
although he may acquit himself of deliberate 
murder, must at least have his mind clouded with 
discontent, when he considers how much another 
has suffered from him; when he thinks on the wife 
bewailing her husband, or the children begging 
the bread which their father would have earned. 
If there are any made so obdurate by avarice or 
cruelty as to revolve these consequences without 
dread or pity, I must leave them to be awakened 
by some other power; for I write only to human 
beings. Johnson, Idler No. 38 ( January 6, 1759).
Those who survived their terms of incarceration recollected 
a life in squalor, where the stench of feces and the decay 
of human flesh loomed through their dark cells wrought 
of pitted iron and reinforced with muted colored stone. 
Their treatment within that institution was comparable 
to that of feral animals whose confiners would induce 
living terror by sheer brutality and starvation. Wardens 
regarded these indigent debtors as indistinguishable 
from those imprisoned for “true” crimes, and many of 
these debtors were forced to interact with these inmates 
or even housed in single cells alongside them.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
population of incarcerated debtors was around ten-
thousand per annum and their numbers rose to become 
more than half the total incarcerated population of 
England. See Stephen Ware, A 20th Century Debate About 
Imprisonment for Debt, 54 Am. J. of Leg. Hist. 351, ( July 
2014). Social and political attention rose as reformists 
and philosophers mounted an offensive against this 
“aberration” by virtue of moral and Christian religious 
platforms. These activists reinterpreted debtors’ financial 
weaknesses as pitiful rather than punishable. Moreover, 
they believed that the current state of affairs produced 
the “decadence” of society, which fostered the greed of 
those who benefited from debtors’ ignoble station. This 
position was also influenced by the recognition that 
human beings should be treated with due fairness given 
the bounds set by Christian philosophy.
That dogma inspired the reformists to argue that the 
human soul  is a precious item—they reasoned that the 
soul was an item of immeasurable value, so no quantifiable 
monetary value justified its shackling. From a more 
secular perspective, reformists further reasoned that 
incarcerating debtors was simply poor execution of law 
and that those incarcerated for debt were the consequence 
of financial “misfortune” rather than “malfeasance.” 
Under that standing law, both circumstances were 
deemed equally culpable due to the vague perception 
of what constituted criminality. Proponents for debtor 
incarceration reasoned that mishandling the property of 
others was a form of  “notorious conduct,” since one party 
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caused a loss to another, and losing money implies some 
sort of wrongdoing. See Gustav Peebles, Washing Away 
the Sins of Debt: The Nineteenth-Century Eradication of the 
Debtors' Prison, 55 Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 701–724 (2013).
The reformists aimed to construct a system that would 
enable the courts to determine the culpability debtors 
faced and to practice it with impartiality. Categorizing 
acts of fraud from “grievous culpability, the grievous 
from the mitigated culpability, and this last from perfect 
innocence” allowed for the dividing line between true 
criminals and simple debtors to be drawn. This division 
curtailed repugnant abuses to the system, like the filing 
of fraudulent debt claims against innocent parties and 
sloppy fact-finding in unjustly expedited trials. See 
Beccaria, Cesare, On Crimes and Punishments and other 
Writings, Bellamy, R., ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. CrossRef, 90 (1995). Eventually, by 
the mid-to-late nineteenth century, English law caught 
up with popular demands that recognized the injustice 
so abhorred by the English citizenry. The Bankruptcy 
Act of 1869 cauterized the wounds that bled the life 
and liberty of the populace, stating in section four of its 
decree that “no person shall, after the commencement of 
this Act, be arrested or imprisoned for making default 
in payment of a sum of money,” unless “fraudulent” 
grounds exist for nonpayment. See WALLACE 
THODAY, IMPRISONMENT BY JUSTICES FOR 
NON PAYMENT OF MONEY, 5 (1936).
Simultaneously, across the Atlantic, a budding nation 
also grappled with the institutional management of 
debtors. The practice of debtor imprisonment did not 
halt at the borders of England, as its colonial progeny 
embraced it as well. The development of debtors’ prison 
in the United States, which relied upon the selfsame 
objectives and societal strife as its English counterpart, 
played an intriguing ideological role in the development 
of American civil law. Federally abolished in the first 
third of the nineteenth century, debtor relief came more 
than three decades earlier than in England. See House 
Report, Abolish imprisonment for debt, 22nd Congress, 1st 
Session, January 17, 1832. Prior to that enactment, almost 
all the states failed to recognize the civil liberties of the 
debtor and struggled to determine a humane means for 
addressing indebtedness. It was by the precedent setting 
of New York legislators that the first official round of 
debtor rights were addressed statutorily. The rest of the 
states followed suit shortly thereafter. See New York 
State Legislature,  An act to abolish imprisonment for debt, 
and to punish fraudulent debtors, April 26, 1831.
During the active state of the former debtors’ prison, 
Pennsylvania particularly comes to the fore when 
discussing collections laws. This state is unique in that it 
was affected most by English law largely due to the scope 
of its economy. Upon becoming a large mercantile hub 
at around the time of the pre-revolutionary era, during 
the late seventeenth century, it was no surprise that its 
development of creditor-debtor law arose as a response 
to the demands of a booming economy. Merchants 
and lenders commonly faced delinquent accounts 
in commercial and consumer settings when serving 
the needs of their community. In response to these 
unsatisfied and disgruntled creditors, Pennsylvania’s 
general assembly enacted statutes to coerce debtors into 
compliance and to determine terms of incarceration for 
debt. These statutes later inspired the other American 
colonies seeking the redress of civil financial wrongs. 
Yet, even with these early collections laws, Pennsylvania 
recognized the impracticality of perpetually detaining 
debtors since they would offer little to no utility while 
incarcerated. Therefore, to address the aim of actually 
recompensing the creditor, Pennsylvania law provided 
the debtor the opportunity to free himself and be released 
unto society under a contract for indentured servitude. 
(Shaiman, S. Laurence, The History of Imprisonment for 
Debt and Insolvency Laws in Pennsylvania as They Evolved 
from the Common Law, 4 The American Journal of Legal 
History, 207-212 (1960.)) This act of freeing the debtor, 
for the sake of debt restitution, could be considered 
the forerunner of the “purge” in contempt cases in 
contemporary courts.
The ability to purge oneself, in the context of the civil 
judicial rules of procedure, is to free oneself of judicial 
contempt by exonerating the contemnor, the one 
who acted willfully and wantonly disobedient, of the 
consequences of one’s actions. An Order for Contempt 
is levied against an individual who fails to abide by the 
mandates of the court. See 38.28, Fla. Stat. (2018). 
This procedure is based on the redeeming act that the 
contemnor demonstrates, specifically by apologizing for 
disobedience and providing rectification of the issue at 
contention in the contempt order. (See Fla. Fam. Law 
R. Proc. 12.615(e) (2019), which demonstrates a general 
nature of the ability to purge.) The purge is the figurative 
key to the contemnor’s cell, as it is one of the final legal 
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The action of purge is an aside from the order of 
contempt. The purge is not applicable for those without 
the actual contempt order granted by the presiding 
judge in a trial. Like many of the foundational laws 
that have been derived from the English, the American 
legal system also adopted the Contempt of Court 
from Common Law’s procedural rules. This adoption 
allowed for a fluidity which enabled substantive laws 
to be ingrained within the court system via procedural 
facilitators. Hence, procedural and substantive law go 
hand-in-hand. Procedural law concerns “the means and 
method to apply and enforce those duties and rights,” 
as determined by the “Due Process” clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, and applied to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Hall v. State, 823 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2002)
(definition), U.S. Const. amend. V (Due Processes scope) 
and U.S. Const. amend. XIV (applicability to the State).
Inversely, substantive law is defined by the Florida 
Supreme Court as the “part of the law which creates, 
defines, and regulates rights, or that part of the law which 
courts are established to administer.” See Haven Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass'n v. Kirian, 579 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1991). Given 
those definitions, the Order for Contempt lies within the 
procedural side of the law. Furthermore, the Contempt of 
Court Order is a tool wielded to obtain a particular aim 
in all aspects of law—to induce compliance and mitigate 
disorder. Substantive law does not regulate the system 
itself but merely establishes the boundaries of law. The 
contempt order enables the furtherance of law because 
it exists as a means for the application of law within 
the court system itself. It can be viewed as analogous to 
theory of a particular branch of study (substantive law) 
and that of the actual practice of that study (procedural 
law).
II. THE JUXTAPOSITION OF CONTEMPORARILY CIVIL 
RENUMERATION AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 
IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND THEIR 
DICHOTOMOUS OBJECTIVES 
It is widely recognized within the field of law that the 
aims of civil and criminal courts are perpendicular 
to one another. Civil courts aim to provide financial 
reconciliation to the party who faced a wrongdoing, to 
return them to a station similar to that which existed 
prior to the wrongdoing. Criminal courts historically have 
imposed a retributivist agenda, i.e., the criminal courts 
seek redress for committed wrongs not by compensation 
(civil agenda), but by means of institutional retribution. 
Retribution appeals to the most innate satisfactions of 
man’s character—redemption via the eye-for-an-eye 
or violence begets violence approach. See Bronsteen, J., 
Buccafusco, C., & Masur, J., Happiness and Punishment, 
76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1071 (2009). In the context of 
collections law, the agendas of both civil and criminal 
courts are not clearly defined.
In a civil legal matter, if the wronged party merited 
justice, the courts would valuate the harm and quantify it 
in dollars. In a criminal case, the courts would value the 
harm by the wrongdoer and quantify justice as a period 
of time that the wrongdoer must endure incarceration. 
These are generalities, but they are representative of the 
purpose of these systems in our society. So, why is it that if 
a debtor in our modern society fails to satisfy a judgment, 
they would face incarceration? Is it not counterintuitive 
given the basic foundations of these systems? Why 
legitimize compromises in civil liberties—the unalienable 
right to be free from incarceration for debt—for the sake 
of procedural compliance? One need not compromise in 
this limited circumstance in postjudgment recovery.
Since the abolishment of the debtors’ prisons, American 
law has plainly stated that no individual shall be subject 
to incarceration for debt. (See above, Roman numeral 
number two of this analysis for particular references in 
history.) Although the procedural mechanism, like the 
contempt of court, exists to promote justice for one 
party, it is at the expense of another’s liberty. There is 
no appropriate incarceration in the circumstance of 
collections, regardless of the delay in repayment that the 
creditor might face. Incarceration should be reserved for 
criminal punishments, not those who are indebted and 
subject to the contempt of court.
Philosophically speaking, one may reason that because 
the judgment is the official acknowledgment of a debt, 
any prior litigation is simply a matter at issue. Following 
this logic, any debt existing prior to the judgment is 
not a legally recognized debt, ergo there can be no legal 
punishment for failing to satisfy. Therefore, if a contempt 
charge was issued and pursued for failure to produce 
requested documentation pre-judgment, then civil 
liberties would not be infringed. In this circumstance, 
the consequences of the contempt are not based on an 
officially recognized debt, but rather serve as an avenue 
for compliance from the party subject to the contempt. 
On the other hand, if a (final) money judgment is 
rendered and the contempt is pursued with the possibility 
of incarceration, the debtor would be imprisoned. This 
imprisonment would constitute a breach of the debtor’s 
12.2: 1-6
4





UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA 
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL
12.2: 1-6
civil liberties since that is an actual debt subject to 
actual legal consequences. A debt without a judgment 
would be a debt with no legal means for recovery, with 
the exception of contacting the debtor via telephonic or 
written means, i.e., dunning (demand) letters. Moreover, 
dissatisfaction for the incarceration for debts has been 
hotly debated in the areas of family and criminal law. 
These cases, like those relating to failures in not paying 
child support monies, or repaying the courts for criminal 
fines and costs, are separate, related issues, but not 
directly within the scope of this analysis. See Andrews v. 
Walton, 428 So. 2d 663 (1983) (incarceration for willful 
nonpayment of child support) and Bearden v. Ga., 461 
U.S. 660 (1983) (criminal court incarceration for failure 
to pay fine or fee). Children, when the financial supporter 
fails to remit monetary support, will face undue hardship. 
Therefore, children’s wellbeing supersedes the interests of 
the supporter since solely the children’s “best interest” is 
considered in court’s determinations of law. See Fla. Dep’t 
of Children & Families v. X. X. G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2010) (best interest determination wielded 
throughout all matters that involve a child).
When discussing situations like Bearden, one must 
consider that the debt at issue, i.e., the fines or fees 
imposed by the courts, are sourced from criminal 
wrongdoing. Unlike the civil counterpart discussed, the 
criminal wrongdoer did not face unintended misfortune. 
Criminals breached a tacitly ingrained covenant, by virtue 
of their membership in their community, to remain free 
from illicit action. By breaching that implied covenant, 
the wrongdoer has degraded the social utility of that 
community and hence done a wrong to all members. This 
criminal also harms that community’s economic utility, 
as the members are forced to pay the costs of the trial.
It is not unreasonable to impose a dual approach to 
punishment in this circumstance—that is, courts should 
incarcerate the criminal to mitigate further societal 
harm and require restitution for the harm caused to 
the community. In other words, given retributivism’s 
ideals, if an individual causes harm to others, they 
must recompense in every manner available to make 
the punishment suitable for the crime. For the civil 
wrongdoer, compared to the previous criminal wrongdoer, 
punishing the debtor via imprisonment, following the 
principles of retributivism, is an excessive punishment 
that does not fit the harm done to society. Even if a civil 
claim has criminal underpinnings, like the civil trial of 
Orenthal James Simpson, the criminal courts, not the 
civil legal system, exert institutional punishment—the 
circumstance must be worthy of bifurcating its criminal 
and civil natures. See Goldman v. Simpson, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 729, 731, (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2008).
Although the issues of domestic relations and criminal 
court are related to the focus of “pure” civil incarceration, 
they are not directly appropriate for the philosophies 
proposed. These circumstances present additional 
variables for consideration (children for family law and 
society for criminal law) that are more important than the 
inequities that the wrongdoer faces. In terms of valuation, 
by way of utilitarian ideals, the collective’s wellbeing is 
prioritized over the wellbeing of the individual. The civil, 
post-judgment circumstance discussed differs from the 
former in that it has no truly justifiable basis aside from 
causing inequitable harm to the unfortunate.
SUMMATION
The failure to repay debts and its relation to civil 
imprisonment is a questionable matter. It has been widely 
accepted that no one individual or entity has a legal 
obligation to repay their debts, but strictly a moral or 
ethical obligation. However, by allowing post-judgment 
pathways to imprisonment,  the civil system undermines 
itself, as the objectives of the criminal courts are melded 
into the objectives of our civil courts. Unless fraud is 
found, whether a debtor is insolvent, legally ignorant, 
or willfully disobedient in post-judgment proceedings, 
the principles of freedom should be prioritized over the 
desires of the civilly vengeful. Debtors are not criminals, 
and they do not deserve the actuality of imprisonment, 
as this punishment is reserved for those who are 
contraveners of the law.
Imprisonment is not the only means for inducement. 
There exist many avenues for creditors to obtain the 
records (or a debtor’s compliance) by more passive 
and humane means, like requesting the production of 
evidence from alternative sources, invoking bankruptcy or 
using one of the varied execution actions available rather 
than strictly pursuing the debtor to exhaustion. Levying 
imprisonment in civil post-judgment proceedings is not 
only against the plainly written laws of our nation, but it 
is a feeble and primitive method to resolve an issue that 
has been debated to exhaustion for over three centuries. 
If our modern society is still incapable of comprehending 
the fundamental principles vested in every one of us, then 
little hope will exist for change in the realm of collections 
law.
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